ABSTRACT. Global politics and local politics, though interlinked today by processes of globalization, remain separated by the phenomenon of distance. Sheer physical distance, with its associated geography, assumes mainly a causal importance. It determines the way a policy is implemented practically, and can affect the outcome of policy. Planning and strategizing, especially in the sphere of foreign policy, are shaped by three other "distances" as well, each with a distinctive logic. The first is gravitational distance, according to which political and other power is thought to "decay" with increasing distance, although the "mass," or size, of countries can modify this assumed attenuation of influence. The second is topological distance, according to which any two countries may seem more remote from one another if there are other countries located in between them, the number and arrangement of these intervening country-spaces-the configuration of the political map-being the key variable. The third is attributional distance, according to which countries seem more distant from or, conversely, nearer to one another owing to their political or cultural characteristics. For example, democracies feel closer to each other than they do to non-democratic states. When all of these three schemes of non-physical "distance" coincide, the resulting pattern of international relationships, whatever the actual distances between nations, is thereby strengthened.
Introduction
International politics and local politics, increasingly alike in a globalizing world, remain separated by the phenomenon of distance. In fact, the "foreign" and "domestic" spheres can be fundamentally distinguished in this way, as many of the characteristic of academe (Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 5) . While not directly related, the approach taken here, though from an American perspective, has an intellectual kinship with the efforts of certain French geographers, notably Yves Lacoste and his Hérodote colleagues (Lacoste, 1984) , to recover geography as a form of strategic thought and a framework for world knowledge. It does not necessarily have, however, the same radical political intent (Hepple, 2000) , but reflects the author's background of teaching diplomatic history, particularly that of the United States, as well as an interest in current issues of international relations and foreign policy.
The above-mentioned three "distances," which are related to but distinct from physical distance, may here be briefly described, for fuller elaboration in later sections of this article. Each "distance" model may be seen to contribute certain insights. Not one of them, it is emphasized, is a complete explanation in itself.
The gravitational model of political distance is based on an analogy with the physical universe, with whose workings the "laws" of politics roughly conform. The basic idea, influenced by Newtonian physics in particular, is that the power which a political body (such as a country) exercises over another body weakens, or "decays," with distance. The distance-decay effect is somewhat counteracted, however, by the size of the entities involved: larger countries exercise greater, and much wider, influence than do smaller countries.
In the topological model, it is the compartmentalization of space that has a "distancing" effect: two countries that are separated by many intervening countries (of whatever size) thus seem geopolitically farther apart than two countries that do not have so many countries situated in between them. However, the variegated pattern of the jigsaw outline of the political map can suggest the formation of alliances that bring countries closer together politically.
The attributional model of distance thinking emphasizes the inherent qualities and, sometimes, regime characteristics that countries may have, with likeness and unlikeness being the key variables. Thus "democratic" countries, no matter where they are placed physically, may feel closer to one another, even in a spatial sense, than they do to non-democratic countries, or "dictatorships." The latter, not possessing democratic systems or adhering to democratic values, may seem distant because of their political differentness. They are thus less likely to be thought of as part of the same "group"-sometimes conceived, quasi-geographically, as a political "region" (Russett, 1967) .
Mental Geography
These systems of distance-thinking, taken together, make the subjective space within which international politics takes place, to a degree, malleable. Not to be confused with physical geography, that which can determine on-the-ground outcomes in the real or external world, this mental geography, which lies at the base of much foreign policy thinking, should not be thought of, however, as simply metaphorical. As Harold and Margaret Sprout made clear in their "man-milieu" analysis, the cognitive environment of policy makers is formed, and re-formed, in constant interaction with hard reality. Nonetheless it is the ideas and images they have of that reality that, together with other considerations, directly influence their policies and decisions (Sprout and Sprout, 1965) .
Geographical ideas, images, and associated reasoning processes, which may not be completely conscious or fully articulated in speech, do exist in the minds of foreign policy makers. It is at the top tier of decision-making that these subjectivities are perhaps most influential. "The higher one moves in the hierarchy of a complex government, the more one is impressed by the remoteness of the ultimate decision-makers from the operational milieu in which their decisions are executed," the Sprouts noted. "What passes for knowledge of the situation (the milieu) at the higher levels consists usually of more or less generalized descriptions and abstracts, several stages removed from on-the-spot observations" (ibid.: 1965: 113-114) .
As suggested at the outset, it is not just the great powers, with world-spanning influence, whose senior leaders and officials are thus removed and may think this way. Even smaller countries, though they may be located next to or near other countries in relatively compact regions, may have far-flung relationships requiring geopolitical thinking at a distance. Owing to globalization, and the proliferation of international linkages it has brought, almost every nation, small as well as large, distant interests and even long-range projects and programs to promote. In a world of individual sovereign and independent states, the number of which today is again increasing, and may rise eventually to two hundred or more, there are simply more long-distance international relationships than there ever were (Henrikson, 1999b) . Every country's diplomacy is becoming global.
A revolution in the technology of transport and, especially, the dissemination of information has made such earth-circling connections, amidst transactions of other kinds, much easier to form and to maintain. Thus the very "global village" of real-time, world-wide communications that Marshall McLuhan (1968) and others foresaw has physically extended the range of world politics. A "network society" is developing, however unevenly, on the widest possible scale (Castells, 2000) . Distance-the totality of relationships-may be seen to be a more important factor in international relations than ever before. Far from seeing the "death of distance" (Cairncross, 1997) , we may in this sense be witnessing, for many peoples of the world, a "rebirth" of it.
What Is "Distance"?
Distance in international relations, some have suggested, is an "illusion." Technological factors progressively have been "shrinking" the world, and reducing the significance of the physical spaces that separate national places (Wohlstetter, 1968) . Thus, for instance, the United States could readily fight a war in Indochina and, more recently, conduct military operations in southwest Asia-Iraq and Afghanistan-as part of a global war against terrorism. Neville Chamberlain's 1938 description, from a British point of view, of tiny Czechoslovakia as "a far-away country" (Gilbert and Gott, 1963: 170) is inconceivable today, from any perspective. Yet, as Colin Gray points out, the British prime minister "spoke truly for most of his countrymen; in terms of psychological distance, Czechoslovakia was infinitely, mysteriously 'Central European'-vaguely romantic, and totally foreign and unknown" (Gray, 1977: 58) .
Much more than traversing physical distance, of course, is involved in overcoming the separation that exists between societies and in establishing meaningful contact, and mutual understanding, between them. "La distance n'est pas le seul élément qui vienne freiner l'échange des informations [Distance is not the only element that slows down the exchange of information]," observes the political geographer Paul Claval. "La communication repose sur l'existence de systèmes de signes connus de ceux se trouvent en liaison. Grâce à eux, il devient possible d'échanger des nouvelles, de nouer un dialogue, d'amorcer un marchandage ou de vaincre l'angoisse que fait naître la solitude" [Communication lies in the existence of systems of signs known by those who find themselves in connection. Thanks to those, it becomes possible to exchange news, to join in dialogue, to begin a bargain or to overcome the anguish of solitude] (Claval 1978: 19) . In brief, culture, also, affects the establishment of communicative links between nations.
"Distance" (from the Latin verb distare, meaning "to stand apart") implies separation of many kinds, cultural as well as geographical. The Old French destance had the sense of "discord" or "quarrel," which was also the earliest in English (The Oxford English Dictionary, 1933: 517 ). Yet physical distance-intervals that can be measured and plotted on the appropriate map-is surely the primary meaning of the term. In a basic sense, distance is just what lay persons think it is: "the degree or amount of separation between two points, lines, surfaces, or objects in geometrical space measured along the shortest path joining them" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1965: 658) . The dictionary's phrase, "the shortest path," must be taken with caution. In the geographical world-the round earth we live on-the shortest distances as the crow flies are great-circle routes, not, strictly speaking, straight lines.
Rarely, except in long-range aviation, do we actually attempt to follow such perfect great-circle routes, or "true azimuths" (Muehrcke, 1978: 160-161) . We rarely even follow straight compass-courses for very long. Actual access to places on earth is more jagged and indirect. Even when taking the shortest route might be possible physically, we might not choose it, for other reasons. The "shortest" commercial flights today from North America to Asia and back today do in fact, more and more, follow great-circle paths which extend partly over the Arctic zone. The cessation of the cold war, which has caused Russian and other air-defense forces to stand down, generally allows this now (Henrikson, 1990) . Meteorology, however, modifies this logic. There is a distinct asymmetry in the route patterns actually being flown by airlines and air cargo companies. The outward legs are different from the homeward legs owing to prevailing wind patterns (The Wall Street Journal, 2000) . The real world is filled with such functional deviations from "true direction," dictated not by the psychology of distance, or what may seem the shortest way, but by the primacy of considerations of time and also of cost.
Units of Measurement
Time-distance and cost-distance are major derivatives, as it were, of physical distance. There is also the effort, or energetic component, involved in transiting space. This, however, is more difficult to measure. The "trouble" that it takes to get somewhere or to find out what is happening in another place has both objective and subjective components, neither of them readily quantifiable. When there are standard units of measurement, as with time-distance and cost-distance, it is possible to display nonspatial derivatives of physical distance graphically (Muehrcke, 1978: 75-78, 164, 185-190) . Cartograms illustrate many kinds of functional distance well, even while distorting actual geography. Often ingeniously conceived and cleverly designed, these map-like diagrams do suggest the "reality" of non-physical kinds of distance. It would be a mistake, however, completely to reduce human distance to its time, cost, effort, or other equivalents.
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International Political Science Review 23 (4) The parameters of the statesman's "vast external realm" are, in the last analysis, physical, though the functional aspects of acting within that space are important, too, in forming the cognitive milieu of decision-making.
Costs of Distance and Obstacles in It
Some analyses of international relations have gone very far in the opposite direction-that is, discounting the importance of actual physical distance. One may cite the economist Eugene Staley's influential pre-Pearl Harbor debunking of "The Myth of the Continents"-more specifically, that of the "Western Hemisphere" and the Monroe Doctrine based upon it. Staley, an Atlanticist and interventionist, prioritized cost-distance. Because transporting things by sea from the United States to ports in western Europe, and thereby aiding England, was less costly than sending goods by railroad or highway, he argued, the notion of Western Hemispheric continental closeness made no sense (Staley, 1941) . A generation earlier, Sir Halford Mackinder, in describing the Eurasian "Heartland," had highlighted the potentially revolutionary consequences for military strategy and international relations generally of transcontinental rail travel, though without estimating costs precisely (Mackinder, 1962 (Mackinder, [1919 : 111). Staley did recognize physical distances, to be sure, pointing out that Moscow, which seemed for US citizens very far away, actually is closer-in direct mileage terms-to the United States than is Buenos Aires in Argentina, though the latter is within the "Western Hemisphere" (Staley, 1941) . At that time, of course, one could not fly straight from the United States to Moscow. Owing to the war in Europe, and also limited aircraft range, air communication with Russia went, by numerous intermediate stages, over the Alaska-Siberia "land bridge"-a very lengthy dogleg-rather than directly across the North Atlantic (Henrikson, 1975: 41-42) .
Phenomenon of Distance
"Our minds carry psychological maps, not ton-mile cost maps," as Colin Gray has rightly noted (Gray, 1977: 59) . The phenomenology of distance, that is, the knowing and experiencing of distance, is at once a matter of reality and of ideas and images. Objective distances and subjective distances are different definitionally. In the mind, however, where the phenomenon of distance is apprehended, they merge. In this mental realm, the factor of distance as such, and of spatial relations generally, cannot be separated out. This is because, as the geographer Robert David Sack has emphasized, "space and its properties are part of all phenomena" (Sack, 1986: 223n) . Measurement, the assessment of space in terms of units, results not just from the placement of a ruler upon a map. It is a subjective, mental process, whose "lengths," "widths," and "heights" are irregular and also elastic. Distances within the "vast external realm" of policy-making may be greater, or sometimes much shorter, than they actually are. The metrics of a policy, with regard to space and also with regard to time, may be significantly "off." Secretary of State Acheson, in describing the foreign policy-maker's task, posited that "the basic problems of our foreign relations are those of understanding the true nature, dimensions, and immediacy of the problems which confront us from abroad and of putting in train the measures with which to meet them" (emphasis added; Acheson, 1973: 249) . Thus the "sizing" of distant problems, and the designing and deploying of solutions to meet them, is a constant challenge. As the US defense analyst, Richard Kugler, has succinctly phrased it, "Gauging Future Strategic Directions" is the difficulty (emphasis added; Kugler and Frost, 2001: I, 358) .
How can this substance-filled but somewhat amorphous world of foreign policymaking, particularly the distance factor that is its very backbone, be analyzed? Apart from physical distance, which is fundamental, there are, as previously noted, three additional "distances"-gravitational distance, topological distance, and attributional distance. Each of these has a bearing on the way political space is thought about, operated in, and acted upon, by makers of foreign policy and military strategists.
These three non-physical but nonetheless geographically related distances, it may be noted, differ somewhat in their temporal implications, or degree to which they are subject to modification over time. The first, gravitational distance, may be the slowest-changing though, as will be seen, it is hardly static, for it relates to the underlying power of countries, which can wax or wane. The second, topological distance, may change somewhat faster, for it affects and is affected by territorial adjustments (partitions, unifications, enlargements, etc.) that may be made in the world's political map. The third, attributional distance, is perhaps the most susceptible to change, for it pertains, most immediately, to the type of government-the regime-a country has. Political leadership can change, quite suddenly. The three "distances" are considered in that order.
Gravitational Distance
Perhaps no idea regarding distance, in its relation to power which informs all politics, is more deeply ingrained in thinking about international relations than the concept of gravity-theoretically, the weakest physical force in nature, but also one that influences everything. The basic idea, almost a commonsensical one, is that distant objects are more difficult to control than ones that are nearby. It also suggests that there is "no escaping" the power of gravity, for it is pervasiveunaffected by intervening objects, or defenses. "Because the effect of force is in inverse proportion to the distance from its source," observed the political geographer Nicholas J. Spykman in America's Strategy in World Politics, "widely spaced regions can preserve a certain degree of autonomy but they cannot hope to live in isolation" (Spykman, 1942: 165) . Political power, somewhat like gravity, is thus assumed to suffuse the whole of geographical space, conceived of as a kind of plain, across which power oozes and spreads.
This does not mean that the resulting world of spatial control, or political domination, is featureless. There are power "cores," or concentrations of natural resources, technology, labor, money, and organizational skill that develop and extend their assets. The influence of such dynamic centers, usually identified with countries or major nodes of activity within them, modifies the gravitational forcefield of international relations. Such a field, conceived as a totality, sometimes is thought of as having a theoretical "center," an abstract point that usually is close to, in relative terms, the dominant power core though need not coincide precisely with it.
During the historical period of the cold war, the political world system was characterized by a remarkable bipolarity. There had been "Mighty Opposites" before in history, as Geoffrey Parker (1998: 96-118 ) depicts these. The recent opposition was based primarily on an equivalence of nuclear weaponry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both sides had "invulnerable retaliatory 444 International Political Science Review 23 (4) forces capable of inflicting unacceptable damage," as Henry Kissinger (1979: 85) has described this strategic predicament. Within the "Western" polar area and, more profoundly, with the world-system as a whole, the locus of international decision-making was in Washington, DC. European leaders, knowing that "their security and prosperity depended on decisions made far away," Kissinger recalls, complained about "inadequate consultation." These US-European "strategic debates," however, were "only the tip of the iceberg," or what appeared on the surface. "The deepest challenge was that after centuries of Europe's preeminence, the center of gravity of world affairs was moving away from it" (emphasis added; ibid.). Around the United States and other such power "cores," which are composites of military, economic, technological, and other sources of strength, there generally are assumed to be "spheres of influence." The edges of these may fluctuate somewhat, with changes in the core itself and also with perturbations in the overall field. Powerful states are not restricted by gravitational principles from engaging in military adventures or taking other expeditionary action, but dispatching military force over very long distances-"power projection," in military parlance-imposes severe logistical demands, and entails heavy costs. Over the long run, such action might not be sustainable.
Operation Enduring Freedom, the military assault conducted by the United States and its coalition partners against al-Qaeda camps and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in response to the events of 11 September 2001, may serve as an illustration of this. President George W. Bush in his January 2002 State of the Union address to Congress said with candor, and probably some anxiety: "It costs a lot to fight this war. We have spent more than a billion dollars a month, over $30 million a day, and we must be prepared for future operations. Afghanistan proved that expensive precision weapons defeat the enemy and we need more of them" (The New York Times, 2002b) . Owing to the high cost of operations in and around that country, plus further new expenses for homeland security, "our budget will run a deficit," President Bush added. This clearly cannot be managed over an extended period of time. The danger of what the historian Paul Kennedy (1987) has called imperial, or strategic, "overstretch" is evident. The United States might be obliged in time to withdraw closer to the center of its power "sphere."
When two core states compete for dominance over the same area, and their gravitational spheres overlap, a "boundary" line of sorts may be sensed in the intervening space. Graphically speaking, this would appear at the point at which the downward-sloping influence curves of the two power pyramids intersect. It was not uncommon to interpret many of the episodes of the geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war years in these terms. "Within what it considers the Soviet orbit," Kissinger then generalized about Soviet behavior, "the Kremlin uses its military forces massively, rapidly, and ruthlessly. But when it operates beyond the dividing line between East and West, it moves with infinite care. The first commitment is usually moderate and justified by arguably defensive motives. At that point it is relatively simple to force a withdrawal by determined opposition" (Kissinger, 1979: 581) . That is to say, it could be obliged to recognize that it was operating beyond its sphere of maximum control-too distantly.
The 1962 Cuban missile crisis affords an illustration. That East-West confrontation occurred very close to the American superpower pole. The island of Cuba is situated only 90 miles off the southern coast of the United States, just HENRIKSON: Distance and Foreign Policy 445 below Florida. Nikita Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders knowingly intervened at a place that was generally understood to be, geostrategically as well as in traditional foreign policy terms, within the "sphere of influence" of the United States. This widespread impression made it much easier, politically as well as operationally, for the US government under President John F. Kennedy to demand, and to gain, a Soviet pull-back. In other regions that are more intermediate-"from Egypt to Angola to Ethiopia," to cite examples that Kissinger gives-the political outcome was less predictable. The basic pattern, of the Soviet Union's tentativeness outside its implicitly recognized sphere of maximum, unchallengeable power, and the West's greater ability to resist it far beyond its "orbit," generally obtained, however (ibid.). An implication of the gravity-distance model is the extreme difficulty a country can have in being truly "neutral" as between poles of power, without being caught up in the force-field of international politics, in which the influence of the strongest power, currently the United States, has extended very far. In discussing the "nonalignment" policy of the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, for instance, Henry Kissinger explained that Tito's "autonomy from the Soviets gave him a greater influence in the developing world than would have been possible for any of the satellite regimes of Eastern Europe." The Yugoslav government was "a sponsor of the annual UN resolution for Puerto Rican independence," notes Kissinger (maybe mindful that Puerto Rico could logically be viewed, and probably was by Tito, as an American "satellite"). Yet "there was a limit beyond which he could not go" in criticizing the United States, Kissinger observed. "He could not afford to antagonize us to a point that made his security depend on the goodwill of the Soviet Union," which might then seek to pull him in. Other "serious nonaligned countries," as Kissinger calls them, such as much larger India, also had to "calculate the margin" within which they could act, though sometimes they could "manipulate the international equilibrium." Kissinger sensed the forces-the gravitational waves-at work, from a US perspective: "Paradoxically, if we approach too closely, they will have to move away; as we distance ourselves, they will have to move towards us; that is the almost physical law of nonalignment" (ibid.: 929).
A very similar pattern of behavior was observed by the political scientist Annette Baker Fox in The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States (1977). On "global-foreign policy issues," she writes with comparative reference to far-away Australia and Brazil, "the more distant countries tended to follow a United States line more closely than did the neighbors; proximity had a negative influence on foreign-policy coordination, as Canada and Mexico strove to look independent or struggled to differentiate themselves from American measures they disliked" (Fox, 1977: 287) . Australia and Brazil, though in the same general "security community" as the United States, evidently did not feel under the same pressure (anti-"pull") to try to distinguish themselves from the United States and the US government's positions. Though ostensibly a contradiction of the political-gravity theory, it can also be interpreted as an indirect confirmation of it. As Fox emphasizes, gravitational influence, arising from proximity, is only a potential influence, not a coercive or irresistible one. Consciously, it can be opposed.
The intellectual historical origins of this way of thinking-that relations among political bodies are governed by "laws" of political gravitation, and their more subtle corollaries such as Kissinger's and Fox's propositions regarding neutral state and middle power behavior-lie, of course, in the early modern development of astronomy and physics, in particular, in the mathematical thought of Sir Isaac
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International Political Science Review 23 (4) Newton. In the Principia (1687), Newton found that every particle in the universe attracts every other particle with a force proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between themthe so-called law of gravitation. Thus if the distance between the centers of gravity of two objects becomes twice as wide, the force between them becomes only a quarter of its original strength. In international politics, by analogy, the influence exerted across distance by national powers (possibly also other more or less solid social units, including supranational or even some subnational entities) varies according to their "weight," or size. The larger political bodies, for example, mainly those classed as great powers, exert a relatively strong influence and thus may seem "closer" than do other, smaller powers that are just as far away. Massiveness and related power give an impression of "presence." This can be widespread, though attenuated. A veteran diplomat from Pakistan once commented to the author, "The United States is the neighbor of every country of the world."
Today, in an Einsteinian era, the Newtonian construction tends to be submerged, although occasionally, even now, as noted, express references are made to smaller countries as "satellites" of larger ones. They are held in thrall, so to speak, by the latter's gravitational weight and might. They are said to be in "orbit." They are related to the larger state as a constant diplomatic companion as well as, in many cases, an economic tributary and a military dependency. This whole "concentric" astronomical model of political organization and international strategizing still shows a profound influence of Newtonian logic.
This gravitational style of thinking was more common in Europe during the era of Louis XIV, le Roi Soleil. In the later Napoleonic period, too, when small and nominally independent states (such as, the Batavian, Helvetic, and Ligurian republics) were built into a kind of geopolitical armillary sphere with France, sunlike, in the middle, these were "satellites." An implication of this power-oriented model of international relations between big and small states is that most of the light comes from the center. Political "satellites" were like moons, pale and lifeless. In Napoleon's Europe, a familial sameness reigned. Somewhat similarly, in the period of the Second World War, Adolf Hitler erected a set of tributary states around Germany, in Mitteleuropa.
A senior member of the US government, secretary of the interior Harold Ickes, commented in October 1938 just after the Munich crisis partially dismembered the Republic of Czechoslovakia: "The countries composing the Little Entente which used to revolve around the French sun now seem to be returning to Germany. This includes even Czechoslovakia or what is left of it. It isn't to be wondered at that the Czechs should make terms with the only power that seems to mean anything in Middle Europe" (Ickes, 1954: 484) . Following the defeat of Germany, these Middle European countries, sometimes referred to generically as "the satellites," became reoriented under Soviet rather than Nazi control, and hence "orbited" the Soviet Union. Josef Stalin was the ideological center-as Tito clearly failed to appreciate when he succeeded, with great difficulty, in breaking away from overt Soviet control in 1948. During the later cold war, when Hungary in 1956 and then Czechoslovakia in 1968 sought to break free of Soviet dominance, they failed. Only the implosion of the Soviet star released them.
The essential mystery of the idea of gravity, non-physical as well as physical, is the notion of instantaneous "action at a distance." Somehow, the gravity model implies, even far-distant bodies can be controlled, continuously and compellingly (though with declining attractive force), without any "visible" means. There is no intervening medium-nothing to carry, or transmit, the influence thus exerted. In Newton's world, space was conceived of as empty, though for Einstein, with his theory of general relativity, it became a filled gravitational force-field. Scientists today, intent upon proving the standard model of particle physics, are questing for the Higgs boson-presumed evidence of a pervasive Higgs field, journalistically described as the wellspring of "molasses" that gives particles in space their mass or weight (The New York Times, 2000) .
For many contemporary geographers, such theoretical notions of space are of little interest. "Distances can be compared and measured, but there is little that can be said abstractly about their potentials to affect behavior," Robert David Sack contends. "Their influence depends on there being actual channels of communication such as roads, railways, and the like, which contain these distances. Indiscriminate substitution of the physical measure of distance for the physically and socially significant channels of communication or interactions runs the risk of treating distance non-relationally" (Sack, 1986: 30) .
While readily accepting this general point, the dependence of human activity on "actual channels" of communication, one can nonetheless recognize that space is not always thought of by mankind, including foreign policy planners and military strategists, only in terms of the specific channels, or precise spatial relationships, through which power flows. The actual connections with far-away places may be far too numerous, too complex, and perhaps also too unstable, even ephemeral, to be "visualized" or otherwise imagined in strictly relational, or "networking," terms. Hence thinking spatially, in the seemingly simpler terms of "distance," becomes almost a psychological necessity. In any case, the sense of space seems to be a primordial feeling, not just a generalized composite of images or impressions of real-world connections.
An impressive effort to salvage the concept of "distance"-particularly, that which here is called gravitational distance-was made by the geographer Patrick O'Sullivan in Geopolitics (1986), though he himself inclines toward the "network" model. An antecedent of this approach is the older "interaction theory" of trade (Alexander and Gibson, 1979: 448) , a Newtonian-influenced explanation of exchange between economic entities that has been generalized to other areas as well by George W. Zipf (1949) and Kenneth Boulding (1962) . If the same amount of force is to be spread thinly, it is only plausible to assume, as O'Sullivan shows, force, while diffusing, loses impact. With every expansion of the radius of a circle of control, the power coverage, overall, is reduced, from infinity at the center to zero at the margin. "If it were expanding symmetrically on an even plain," O'Sullivan reasons in Euclidean fashion, "then the potency of power would attenuate at a rate of 2π for every extension of the imperial radius" (O'Sullivan, 1986: 59) .
The costs of empire are, of course, often highest at the very margins, where frontiers must actually be defended. This does not necessarily mean that the margins have to be controlled absolutely. It presumably does mean, however, that a country that considers itself a power must have enough strength to be able to exclude others from its frontiers, which is one way of conceiving of the idea of "sphere of influence." The gravitational model, with its smoothly curved lines showing distance-decay gradients (see, ibid.: 52-68), does not fully account for the attention that statesmen have paid and often must pay to frontier, or border, policy. Societies, too, may focus on relationships at borders, for that is where they 448 International Political Science Review 23 (4) directly "interface" with their neighbors, whether friendly or hostile (Henrikson, 2000) . Particularly on landward borders, where societies are contiguous, pressures may build. "Gravitational" power, if blocked, may be thought of as piling up there. Tension may be particularly high if the actual border line does not coincide with the theoretical, or imaginary, "boundary" located at the point of intersection of the downward-sloping power curves of neighboring countries, one of which might be much bigger and mightier than the other. The struggle between India and Pakistan, focused at their common political border and the vaguer "Line of Control" in Kashmir, is a current example.
The factor of will, along with weight, must be taken into account in analyzing international relations. "The ability to project power and the will to project power are not at all synonymous," Colin Gray comments (Gray, 1977: 59) . Not infrequently, it would seem, the peripheral areas and populations of countries are treated by the countries' leaders, situated comfortably in national capitals, at or near their countries' geographic centers, with relative indifference. "Core" values or "vital" interests may not seem to them to be at stake at the borders. This ideovolitional phenomenon may be based on a sense of human territoriality-the imperative or, alternatively, instinct that the "home base," such as Washington, DC must be protected at all costs. Such a "domi-centric" perspective, emphasizing close-by and familiar space, gives a leader a way of assessing distance in an evaluative way (Trowbridge, 1913) .
This feeling of personal and social centrality, in relation to peripheral, and less familiar, objects at increasing physical removes, is surely to some degree biologically based (Laponce, 1987) . Physiology and psychology thus may coincide with physics and astronomy. Reasoning analogously, O'Sullivan notes: "In addition to the material friction of distance there does seem to be a gradient of boldness which operates for individuals and groups." He cites the ethologist Konrad Lorenz's description of the territorial rites of the stickleback, which seems to lose courage, or at least behavioral aggressiveness, when away from home (Lorenz, 1972) . Two of these prickly fish, males, establish a de facto boundary between their domains by engaging in a set of attacks and counterattacks with the resolve of each "waning" as it gets farther from its own nest. "Such a loss of courage or of moral certainty at a distance," O'Sullivan speculates, in a comparison with foreign policy, "seems to have been at work on the performance of the USA in Southeast Asia and the USSR in the Caribbean" (O'Sullivan, 1986: 11) . One does not have to accept the linkage of biology to human territoriality, as Robert David Sack expressly does not, however, to recognize that a society's will to fight, and to risk loss of lives, can diminish with remoteness from home (Sack, 1986: 2) .
Besides the "cost" and the "will" explanations of the distance-decay phenomenon associated with the gravity model, there is perhaps one final explanation: namely, lack of knowledge-and, consequently, the human understanding that is made more difficult by geographical remoteness. This is perhaps the most crucial element in the "Acheson gap," described at the outset. The historian is reminded of the telling critique made in 1947 by Walter Lippmann of the state department planner George F. Kennan's initial exposition of his "containment" concept, which proposed the application of "counter-force" around the perimeter of the Soviet Union. Lippmann considered it a "strategic monstrosity." The United States could not "by its own military power" contain the expansive pressure of the Russians, Lippmann objected, "at every point where they show signs of encroaching," in Kennan's own phrase. He continued: "A diplomatic war conducted as this policy demands, that is to say conducted indirectly, means that we must stake our own security and the peace of the world upon satellites, puppets, clients, agents about whom we can know very little. Frequently they will act for their own reasons, and on their own judgments, presenting us with accomplished facts that we did not intend, and with crises for which we are unready." Instead of "reaching out for new allies on the perimeter of the Soviet Union," Lippmann advised, the makers of US foreign policy should be "concentrating their attention and their efforts upon our old allies of the Atlantic community" (emphasis added; Lippmann, 1947: 18, 21, 23, 25) .
A heightening of strategic concern about an area does, of course, provide incentives for learning more about it, and reducing the ignorance-distance that may have existed. The next section will suggest how the logic of the geopolitical map itself can indicate what places in the world might be of interest to strategic planners. The force of the gravity model restrains this logic, however. "The 'loss of strength gradient' hypothesis, that power varies inversely with distance, is sheer nonsense in the context of the communications/transport technology of the second half of the 20th century," asserts Colin Gray (1977: 59) . That would seem even more true in light of technological developments since that time. Gray also acknowledges, however, that, barring "ethnic-religious" and "semi-sentimental historical" connections, "it is not misleading to claim that concern, interest, and knowledge do vary roughly inversely with distance" (ibid.). This distance reality is likely to persist.
Topological Distance
The second kind of distance that is politically significant derives from topology, a branch of geometry that also became a basis of non-mathematical sciences, including social psychology (Lewin, 1936) . Topological space is a generalization of Euclidean space in which the idea of closeness, or limits, is defined in terms of configurations of points, or point sets. In combinatorial or algebraic topology, geometric figures are considered as aggregates of smaller building blocks, or groups. The concern of topology is with those properties of geometric figures that remain unchanged when deformation in them occurs, as when a figure is bent, stretched, squeezed, or otherwise distorted, without breaking or tearing. "Rubbersheet" geometry, it is sometimes therefore called. A set of points taken from a person's face-or, on a bigger scale, from the earth's terrain-would remain topologically invariant when transferred from their spherical base onto a plane. Though visibly reshaped, with some distances appearing longer and some shorter, they would be mapped accurately.
In mapping parcels of land (such as cities, countries, regions, continents), a topologically oriented geographer would apply the same principles of transformation. What matters are the spaces arrayed on the map, rather than their measurable size or any other distinctive quality. In the context of the present discussion, topological distance therefore may be thought of in terms of the configuration of political spaces-mainly, countries-that there are between two places, whatever the actual, physical, and metrizable distances that may lie between these. Basically, the more countries there are between A and B, in the jigsaw puzzle of the political map, the greater the "distance" between them.
In the discipline of geography, topology has in the past been applied mainly to the history of regions as these may have changed physically over time. In human 450 International Political Science Review 23 (4) geography, topology may involve the study of what might be called the logic of places, that is, reasoning about communities as they are spatially partitioned from one another in an overall pattern, the human ecumene. In political geography, the focus here, the topological approach refers, as stated, to the outlines of countries on the world map. There is from this point of view less interest in the precise size or areal extent of countries than there is in the somewhat abstracted, or generalized, positions they occupy and, especially, in the strategic implications of the interrelationships of those positions.
In contemplating the map of Africa, for example, what would stand out to a topologically oriented strategist would be not so much the vastness of that continent (into which all of the United States with Alaska, Europe, and China could be fitted) but, instead, the fact that there are 53 countries within its space, arranged in a relatively stable spatial order. It is the political compartmentalization of the continent that is of interest because it is this pattern that is the basis of alliance and alignment formation, as well as rivalries and conflicts. The nineteenth-century "scramble" for Africa by the western colonial powers, mainly European, parceled out the continent's lands in a process of both fragmentation and consolidation (Barraclough, 1978: 240-241 ). Africa's national independence movements of the twentieth century generally accepted this somewhat artificial framework (ibid.: 282-283; Thompson, 1969; Makonnen, 1983) .
Though at variance in many places with the anthropological history and living demography of the African continent, this uniform-appearing political map, with its many straight lines and sharp angles as well as irregular watershed-and riverbased borders, remains the basic "playing field" of Africa's international politics today. Subregional and regional associations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the broader Organization of African Unity (OAU), have provided additional layers of political organization, superimposed upon the basic international one. It is this complex of topological spaces, not only the voluminousness of Africa in physical geography, that underlies the special sense of "distance" that foreign policy makers can and often do have when thinking about diplomatic relationships in and with Africa. Their "mental maps" of the African continent, though these may be lacking in specific terrain knowledge or even an accurate sense of spatial scale, do generally include a fairly complete picture of its political structures at different levels.
An illustration of this topologically based way of geopolitical thinking is the strategy that secretary of state Henry Kissinger adopted when he made his first trip to Africa in April 1976 to give a speech in Lusaka, Zambia, that would place the influence of the United States "squarely behind majority rule in Southern Africa." Kissinger then considered that the cooperation of "the front-line states, especially Tanzania and Zambia," was a requisite. That was his and his colleagues' strategy at the subregional level. He was concerned about strategic coverage of the continental level too. He believed he needed, therefore, the support of the OAU "in order to insulate the emerging process from pressures or blackmail by nonAfrican states"-presumably Soviet Russia but possibly also communist China as well as perhaps certain of the former colonial powers in Europe. That required very careful attention to the configuration of the African political map, and a planning of a deliberate diplomatic hopscotch across it. "For this reason," Kissinger explained, "I included a variety of English-and French-speaking countries on the itinerary-specifically Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Liberia, and Senegal" (Kissinger, 1999: 925) .
HENRIKSON: Distance and Foreign Policy 451
The political affairs of Europe, comprising the interrelationships and interchanges of almost as many countries (depending on how exactly "Europe" is defined), are very complex in much the same way, if, of course, within a physically narrower scope. Europe is a kind of peninsula of the vast Eurasian landmass. In the European case, political complexity is compounded by a high degree of physiographic convolution, which in fact goes a long way toward explaining its variegated political structure as territorially displayed today on the map. "The topography of the continent," observed Jean Gottmann in The Geography of Europe, "is broken into small sections, and is so varied from section to section, that to group all these aspects in a few main physiographic regions is not the fairly simple proposition that it is for larger and more massive continents such as the Americas, Asia, or Africa. An irregular checkerboard seems to be the best that can be offered in the way of a definition" (Gottmann, 1965: 13) .
Gottmann's geography-based "checkerboard" metaphor is especially suggestive in this context. The idea of a checkerboard-or, more commonly, chessboardrecurs constantly in the history of thought about international relations, especially with reference to Europe. A checkerboard or chessboard is a game board. The essential game element-the impulse of strategy, as exercised from different positions on a field-has animated European affairs for centuries. Classically, it has done so in accordance with the principles and operating rules of the European "balance of power" (Gulick, 1955; Dehio, 1963) . In Europe's traditional game of states, each piece on the board-big power, small power, or statelet-had a kind of encoded value and movement potential. There were five or six great powers, which dominated. The others, particularly the smaller countries, offered strategic "sacrifice" and political "compensation" material. The later entry from the outside of even greater powers-the US and Soviet Union-altered Europe's power relationships and expanded the scope of its contest, but did not totally change the nature of the game itself.
During the period of the cold war and afterward, perhaps the most striking example of such an explicitly "chess game" view of Europe's and the world's affairs is that of the Polish-American political scientist and high-level government official, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served in the administration of President Jimmy Carter as national security adviser. In Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the US-Soviet Contest (1986) and in The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997), Brzezinski posits the connections between the spatially complex pattern of Europe and, beyond that, Eurasia and the need for American strategic design and maneuver. Eurasia, geographically vast and cumulatively powerful but "too big to be politically one," is, in his view, "the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played." He writes: "This huge, oddly shaped Eurasian chessboardextending from Lisbon to Vladivostok-provides the setting for 'the game'" (Brzezinski, 1997: 31, 35) .
For expository purposes here, the emphasis is placed on the chessboard itself, to a greater degree than on the chessmen or on the strategy, the "game plan." All of these elements are, of course, conceptually inseparable. The "grand chessboard" of Eurasia is a topological abstraction from physiographic, demographic, economic, and, especially, political-juridical realities. It also has a time dimension. It is boundary lines, past, present, and future. As Professor Brzezinski's style of strategic reasoning indicates, this framework of analysis is dynamic. It is a simplification, but one that appears necessary to help foreign policy makers play 452 International Political Science Review 23 (4) the game of diplomacy regarding far-away places and spaces they cannot know in detail-and, no less importantly, to explicate it to others. These topological constructions may be essential to theorizing about world politics in general. Before the discourse comes the map. The spatial order of international politics may need to be defined, first. "The idea of the pattern of power," observed the historian Martin Wight, "enables us to generalize about international politics in relation to their geographical framework" (Wight, 1966: 149) . A substantive example of the kind of reasoning that such geo-topologically based mapping enables is the proposition, which Wight traces as far back as Philippe de Commynes' Memoirs (1524), that there is a "universal hostility between neighbouring Powers." The British historian Lewis Namier, extending this proposition, discerned a "system of odd and even numbers" in international relations. Namier called this also the "sandwich system of international politics" (Wight, 1966: 149) . That is to say, countries that are situated next to each other tend to be suspicious and even hostile. Countries on the opposite sides of those, however, tend to be friendly and mutual helpful. This pattern of alternating enmity and amity-potential, if not actual-continues on across the map.
In the actual history of foreign policy making, certain specific nations such as France, as their geographical situations indicate, generally have followed this rule of alliance en revers-that countries do, and should, ally with countries located to the rear of neighboring adversaries. Accordingly, France traditionally has sought to protect itself and to seek counterbalances against neighboring Germany. It has done so by forming alliances and "ententes" with countries or groups of countries on the far side, or at the back, of Germany-that is, with Poland, when Poland was independent and strong, or, when Poland was occupied or weak, with Russia. It also formed, for the same geostrategic reason, the aforementioned Little Entente (Petite Entente) countries of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. On the smaller, subregional scale, these three small countries themselves were drawn together during the interwar period in opposition to their common and resentful neighbor Hungary whose territory, much reduced by the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, they almost completely surrounded.
In generalized terms, the equilibrium of Europe as a whole traditionally has been maintained in a pattern of the two "sides," powers in the west and in the east, coalescing against the middle. "It is a fundamental law that the outer regions in the west and east function, directly or indirectly, as counterweights to a concentration at the centre," stated the historian Ludwig Dehio after the Second World War (Dehio, 1963: 102) . In his own view, the involvement of the United States, from far outside the European system, and the Soviet Union, from a semiexternal position, destroyed Europe's "Precarious Balance" as it hitherto had operated. Europe's historic multipolar balance had been replaced by a geographically much wider, but from a European perspective intrusive and somewhat oppressive, bipolar balance.
This bipolar geostrategic confrontation, having nearly a global scale, was something new. From the distant prospect of the United States of America, Russia, traditionally, had been regarded as a possible "friend" at the rear of its own historic adversary, Great Britain (Bailey, 1950) . During the American Civil War there was even a measure of cooperation between the United States and Imperial Russia, both of these countries fearing British intervention, maritime or territorial. The sale of Russian Alaska to the United States in 1867 was prompted in part by this geopolitical reasoning-a shared anxiety about British moves. The United States gained further protection against British power in Canada. Henceforth Russia could concentrate its expansion on its far east (Bassin, 1999) . To US policy makers during the nineteenth century, Russia itself did not become a serious strategic threat. On the world map, the Mercator projection used at that time and long afterward, Russia was situated behind, completely on the other side of, America's most likely challengers, namely, Great Britain and, later, Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan as well.
World War II radically changed the geostrategic relationship between the United States and Russia. It caused those two countries, which were wartime "allies" but possible adversaries in the future, directly to face, or confront, one another. Owing in part to the war-caused shift in the pattern of communication between them to shortest-distance air routes on the fringes of the Arctic area, North Pole-centered maps on the azimuthal equidistant projection, rather than equator-based Mercator projection maps, began to be used by US strategists. Russia "suddenly" became a close, even immediate neighbor of the United States-across a broad front in the vast Arctic region, not merely at the narrow Bering Strait between American Alaska and Russian Siberia (Henrikson, 1975; 1980a: 83-86; 1997: 107-109) . Even before the Second World War was over, Walter Lippmann could see that "Russian-American relations will no longer be controlled by the historic fact that each is for the other a potential friend in the rear of its potential enemies" (Lippmann, 1943: 145) .
The topo-logic of US strategy now had to be different. The looming presence of the huge Soviet Union, directly above, with all of its long-range offensive weapons, required a new search for allies. The situation even came to suggest a US "strategic" alliance with the People's Republic of China. This country had its own border-area tensions with Russia. Henry Kissinger, as national security adviser, feared that a full-scale invasion by the Soviet Union of China at points along their long common border in 1969 "might tip not only the geopolitical but also the psychological equilibrium in the world" (Kissinger, 1979: 177, map 174-175) . In accordance with such reasoning, as well as of course other factors (such as a desire to get out of the Vietnam war), the United States government began to give China, rather than Russia, diplomatic and some technical support. Geostrategically speaking, this was an alliance en revers across the top of the globe.
The disappearance of intervening topological spaces between powers can remove their "buffers," increasing the possibility of friction, even war, between them. A "buffer zone" in political geography, though usually narrow in physical terms, can vary in width. It constitutes a barrier and may serve as a shock absorber. This is in part because of its internal complexity-the number of "spaces," or political-geographical cells, within it. Though their terrain can be difficult, buffer areas rarely are solid entities, in the sense of being highly defended, militarily impregnable territory. Buffer states, too weak to defend themselves though capable of offering some resistance, are meant to provide "padding." Generally, the more layers there are, in terms of serried ranks of polities, even if these political units are very small, the better the protection that is offered. As with bubble wrap, the more layers there are, the greater and more reliable the cushioning effect they provide-for the benefit of the big powers in the background and, arguably, the international system as a whole. Buffer states are substitutes for and the functional equivalents of comforting distance. They are, in a sense, "distancing units."
Historically, the major powers of Europe, with variations introduced by their 454 International Political Science Review 23(4) geographical locations, have sought security in having smaller and often subsidiary entities arrayed around them. Germany, for example, shielded itself in the east with a series of marches-militarily controlled border territories under markgrafs, or markgraves. These extended from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea: the Billung March, in the north, to the March of Istria, in the south (see map, "European marches," in Prescott, 1987: 49) . Some European powers also have set up buffer states outside Europe. "Britain's prime boundary strategy in the Indian subcontinent involved maintaining a system of small, weak states between British India and the territories of Russia, China, and France," explains the expert on political boundaries, Victor Prescott. "In the Himalayas, Britain encouraged the existence of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan to separate China and India." In Africa, some European colonial powers "employed neutral zones to serve the same function," an example being the neutral zone set up by Germany and Britain in 1887 to separate their respective spheres in Togoland and the Gold Coast. Such neutral zones often were established by joint decision, as in the Anglo-German case, and thus were supervised by joint action. In the Middle East, too, the neutral zone technique sometimes was used. By 1973 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia eliminated a neutral zone they had maintained between them (ibid.). Conceivably, this lack of a buffer heightened the already grave concern that Saudi authorities felt when, in August 1990, Iraq's leader, Saddam Hussein, sent his military forces southward to occupy all of Kuwait. The threat seemed a direct one, even though a large area of desert existed between the Iraqi army and the Saudi capital and other major cities.
The interests and wishes of the residents-the peoples-living in such intermediate zones often have been disregarded by the great powers. The inhabitants, whether nomads, villagers, or urban dwellers, were there, in their physically uncertain status, in part to serve the powers and the system. The very term, "shatterbelt," often used by big-picture analysts to describe such zones, suggests the fragility of their local situations. To the political geographer Saul B. Cohen a "shatterbelt" is almost by definition unable to resist pressures from the outside. By "shatterbelt," similar to "crush zone" or "shatter zone" used by earlier writers, Cohen expressly means "a politically fragmented area of competition" between what he characterizes broadly as the maritime and continental realms. By the end of the 1940s, two such "atomized regions" had emerged: in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia. In the 1970s and 1980s subSaharan Africa also became a shatterbelt region owing to the intrusion of the cold war contest there. Cohen regards the Middle East, which conceivably could be integrated into a "EuroMediterranea" or other broader entity such as an "Islamic bloc," as still having some shatterbelt characteristics-in the Gulf area particularly (Cohen, 1999: 53-55) .
In effect, as noted, "buffer zones," or "shatterbelts," composed as they are of relatively small compartments of largely indefensible space, are strategic stand-ins for distance. Often the most important thing they offer policy makers and strategists is time-time to prepare, time to decide, time to execute. When a country such as Israel, for instance, lacks such "defense in depth," it may feel a need for other, quicker means of defending itself. In 1970 national security adviser Kissinger was critical of the state department's desire that Israel give up its control of the Sinai peninsula without allowing it a counterbalancing increase in military air strength, which would allow it to respond to a possible Soviet-backed Egyptian move quickly and decisively. "The State approach," he then advised President Richard Nixon, "would have us force the Israelis back to pre-war borders while they get no further planes after the summer. They would be asked to give up both elements of their security at the same time-their territorial buffers and the prospect of more aircraft" (Kissinger, 1979: 577-578) . Space thus can have a "disarming" effect, and lack of space a "rearming" one.
An alternative topology-based security strategy is to create larger, common spaces. Rather than to try to build up lateral spaces, such as cushioning or buffering zones around one's country, on the same geopolitical plane, a far-seeing statesman might seek instead to form broader and thus more inclusive spaces on a higher, or meta-geographical, and perhaps more ideological plane. These wider "spaces" would be associative rather than dissociative. Shatterbelt zones rarely have common political institutions or even well-articulated regional groupements, the French geopolitical term for voluntary associations. They are difficult to make cohere. Neither a "Euro-Mediterranea" nor an "Islamic bloc," to refer to Cohen's illustrative images of regional integration for the Middle East, is a strong historical probability.
A meta-geographical "construction" that does seem to be capable of realization is "Europe," with the European Union, headquartered in Brussels, serving as its organizing center (Jönsson, Tägil, and Törnquist, 2000) . As this case illustrates, to have an idea of a whole, or a single inclusive space, can alter the relations of the component spaces, or parts, which thereby become transformed, though not necessarily fused, into a new and larger entity. The whole then predominates over the parts. This topological process, well known in Gestalt psychology, can work at the international level as well as at the level of the person-the social mind as well as the individual mind.
Former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright used just such socialpsychological and also topological-geographical reasoning when, for example, during the 1999 crisis over Kosovo she emphasized to the Senate foreign relations committee that the "stakes" were very high in the Balkans. Something larger was at issue. "To understand why that is," she pointed out, "we need, as President Clinton has repeatedly urged, to consult the map. Kosovo is a small part of a region with large historic importance and a vital role to play in Europe's future." The Balkan region is "a crossroads," she explained, giving religious, historical, and geographical detail. "Today," she declared, in almost explicit Gestaltist, topological language, "this region is the critical missing piece in the puzzle of a Europe whole and free" (Albright, 1999a: 5-6) .
The "Europe whole and free" concept, still current in American foreign policy declarations, was an inheritance from the presidency of George H. W. Bush. This figure of speech and also geopolitical image was advanced by the first President Bush during a visit to Europe in 1989 before the fall of the Berlin Wall (Zelikow and Rice, 1997: 31) . "The Cold War began with the division of Europe," the president said in Mainz. "It can only end when Europe is whole." Alluding to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's rival vision of a common house of Europe, he observed that "there cannot be a common European home until all within it are free to move from room to room." Thus Europe's topological spaces would remain, but their significance as partitions would be reduced. There was even a suggestion of the erasure of some of its dividing lines. Asked by reporters to explain a phrase he had earlier used, "beyond containment," Bush said: "It means a united Europe. It means Europe without as many artificial boundaries" (ibid.). The controlling spatial image was, and remains, that of "one" Europe.
At the present juncture of world affairs, a question is whether it is better for 456 International Political Science Review 23(4) nations, most of which now have achieved full legal and political independence, to remain "apart," in topological spaces of their own, rather than to become integrated into, and perhaps somewhat subsumed within, larger, encompassing, and to some extent supranational entities, such as the European Union. The question is a serious one. Some, including this writer, would argue that "stability" requires formal and mutual commitment among express international communities. Others, however, value, not only for themselves but also for the international system, the "freedom" that goes along with being not-merged. Whether to come under the roof of an international "house" or to have a national "room of one's own" is a decision that depends on the content-the values, norms, and rules-of the cooperation that nations may undertake. That is the subject of the next section.
Attributional Distance
The decision to associate or not, and perhaps even how to do so, depends not only on geographical mass (gravity) or on location (topology) but also on non-geographical affinities, that is, on the attributes that countries do, or do not, share. It is not a misuse of the word, and is in fact common, for foreign policy makers to speak of attributional affinities and disaffinities, and the relationships based on these, in terms of "distance." In this case, the relationship to geography becomes more remote, but it is still present. To some extent, countries are arrayed in the geographical "mental maps" of policy planners and strategists, in an extended spatial sense, according to how "close" or "far away" they are from the policy-makers' country in terms of ideology, type of government, party affiliation, economic system, human rights record, and many other such qualities, or attributes.
A prime example is a statement made by secretary of state Albright in 1999 before the Senate appropriations committee on foreign operations. "Here in our own hemisphere," she said, "we have important interests dictated not only by proximity of geography, but by proximity of values." These included "democracy" and "market economics" to which, at their summit meeting in Miami in 1994, President Bill Clinton and "the other 33 democratic leaders of our hemisphere" affirmed their commitment. These countries of Latin America and the Caribbean were thus, at least nominally, drawn together with those of North America by their common commitment to "representative and constitutional government," which permitted "multi-party" participation in political life, and also to liberalization of their investment and trade systems. There was one odd man out, however. The country of Cuba, while under the grip of Castro's communist dictatorship, would remain, in effect, an outcast. Secretary Albright declared: "Unfortunately, Fidel Castro continues to justify his pariah status by throwing dissidents and human rights advocates in prison, and refusing to hold free and fair elections." The US government therefore would continue to shun the Castro regime, keeping it at a political distance-even, in a sense, outside the Hemisphere. The "simple principle" that guided American policy, Secretary Albright said, is that "the Cuban people deserve the same rights and liberties as their counterparts from Argentina to Alaska." In other words, there was a democratic and free-market attribute-space of which Cuba was not a part.
Its distance from the other American states need not be permanent, however. The Clinton administration had taken steps, she reported, "which expand our efforts to reach out to the Cuban people and help prepare for a peaceful transition to democracy." It would be "easier for Cubans to be in touch with family and friends in the United States, and easier for the Cuban-American community to help those on the island." As President Clinton had explained, the US goal was "to strengthen people-to-people ties and encourage the development in Cuba of peaceful activities independent of the government" (Albright, 1999b) . In short, a regime-change in Cuba, coming sooner or later, could quickly reintegrate the Cuban nation into the Hemispheric attribute-community.
A particularly systematic way of studying the relationship of the values prevalent in countries and the actual interaction of societies in geographic space has been that followed by R. J. Rummel and his colleagues in their major political-scientific comparative enterprise, the Dimensionality of Nations (DON) project. The approach taken therein is much more methodical than that of planners of foreign policy in the US department of state or other countries' ministries of foreign affairs. In substance, however, the purpose is much the same. The mathematized "social field theory" that Rummel and the others in the DON group have developed is the basis of the proposition they advance, with regard to the nations taken in pairs or dyads (for example, the United States and Cuba), that "the position of dyads in the behavioral space of their interactions is a resultant of the distances between nations in attribute space" (emphasis added). That is to say, the amount of interaction between any two countries is influenced by, or at least correlated with, the degree of difference, or "distance," in their various attributes. In a basic test of this proposition carried out by "regressing nation profiles across behavioral patterns onto the economic, political, and social distances between the nations," Rummel and colleagues found that "about 90 percent of the variation in dyadic profiles on the cooperation behavior dimensions (e.g., transactions, diplomatic interaction, international organizations) was accounted for by the distances" (Rummel, 1972: 412, 414) . That is, perhaps to state the point too simply: countries that are alike tend to like to work with each other. Those that are unalike, do not.
Among the numerous attributes that were surmised by the DON researchers to be potentially important as causative factors in determining the degree of cooperative and other interaction between countries in the international "social field" are not only the usual economic indicators and other size-related dimensions but also political orientations and religious values, such as, "Catholic culture." The DON correlation matrix, with its vast array of indicators of the attributional and behavioral dimensions of nations, does reveal significant patterns of covariance, or "closeness." Certain basic geographical and spatial factors were taken into account by the project too, including nations' physical contiguity and also "air distance from US" and "air distance from USSR" (ibid.). A country's political "equidistance" between both of the superpowers of the cold war, presumably, was easier to maintain if it was based on an actual physical equality of distance, in mileage terms, between them. Geographical locations, however, are not "attributes" in the ordinary sense of the term. It is beliefs and values that count most in this realm, which is essentially an ideological one.
A major US official effort to form an attribute-based international groupinggroupement, in the French geo-political sense-was the ministerial meeting, which the United States organized together with Poland, that took place in June 2000 in Warsaw under the banner, "Toward a Community of Democracies." The conference was intended to be, as the assistant secretary of state for human rights affairs, Harold Koh, later said, a kind of "democratic contact group" (Koh, 2000) . 458 International Political Science Review 23 (4) distinguished thinkers and experienced statesmen from among the world's various regions and traditions, more fully articulated the core values of the UN's Dialogue among Civilizations in the book, Crossing the Divide. Among the lessons stated in it is the observation that the present world, "compressed" by globalization, by which spatial and temporal distances have been very greatly reduced, "has never been so divided" in many other respects. Even within "the same territorial proximity" there can be profound gaps in living conditions and discrimination as well. "We can frequently be partners in conversation and professional life with associates thousands of miles apart," Giandomenico Picco and the other authors stated, "and yet be strangers to our neighbors" (Picco et al., 2001: 22) . Paradoxically, the overcoming of physical distance at the global level can actually increase social, cultural, and perhaps even political-or attributional-distance at the local level. The inter-civilizational Dialogue needed to be conducted at home as well as abroad.
Conclusion
Have we today arrived at the Global Village? Is distance now immaterial? Are the barriers between "domestic" and "foreign" affairs largely broken down, and the distinction between them insignificant? Is the study of political geography itself, after such physical distance-shattering events as those of 11 September 2001, relevant anymore? It was suggested at the beginning of this article that, because of the expansion of the scope of international interest and involvement of even the world's most clustered and smallest states, not merely the relatively few "great" powers that historically have had global interests, the importance of the distance factor-the spatiality of international relations, that is, the sum total of spatial relations between and among the world's societies-may have increased. As the analysis in subsequent sections has been intended to show, distance in its various forms does, still, matter, in profoundly important ways. The policy maker's "Acheson gap" of difficulty in understanding foreign places and peoples, even if narrowed in some ways, still exists. Especially in implementing policy, physical distance itself remains a key factor. In other respects, physical distance is indeed, as some commentators have contended, an "illusion" (Wohlstetter, 1968) . But, in ways that have been shown, it is still a meaningful illusion. It must be remembered that, as the Sprouts have emphasized, it is mental maps, which are needed in a large world ("this vast external realm"), that are the immediate platform for policy making and strategic decisions (Sprout and Sprout, 1965) .
The three types of "distance," in addition to the great-circle and other distances that must actually be traversed in transport and communication, which have been examined in the foregoing sections do remain in force. Gravitational theory, perhaps especially applicable in the economic sphere though pertinent to powerrelated global political activity too, helps to explain the existence of regional concentrations of behavior, and also can help to predict actual volumes of interchange, including trade, investment, etc., that are likely to occur across varying distances. If the entities involved, such as, the United States and China, are massive enough, even the broad Pacific Ocean is no barrier to intensive trade and other exchanges. The future development of the European Union will constitute another massive entity. When enlarged to the east, the EU eventually will have a market more than twice the size of that of the United States. Especially if it is 460 International Political Science Review 23 (4) internally consolidated, the EU will become a giant with vast drawing, or gravitational, power. Its new common currency, the euro, will be another factor extending its influence. That statesmen do actually think in this way is evidenced by the May 2000 Humboldt University speech of German foreign minister Joschka Fischer in which he provocatively suggested that there be closer Franco-German cooperation so as to form a "center of gravity." This pairing would be the power core of future European integration. "For those who wish to participate but do not fulfill the requirements," Fischer did acknowledge, "there must be a possibility to be drawn closer in." Therefore there could be gradations of involvement, and perhaps a graduation, over time, from one phase or level of involvement to another. The Franco-German core must not be too egocentric or self-confining. "Such a center of gravity must also have an interest in enlargement and it must be attractive to the other members." No state could be forced to go further toward integration than it was able or willing to go, he allowed. But those in the European Union who did not wish to go further could not prevent others (mainly Germany and France) from doing so. If possible, the foreign minister said even somewhat threateningly, "the center of gravity will emerge within the treaties. Otherwise it will emerge outside them" (Fischer, 2000) . The power of mass, therefore, matters.
Topological reasoning in the conduct of international affairs also is evident in the real world. This is partly because, as noted, the totality of "distances" among countries in terms of the number of spaces between them is increasing, notably in the area of the broken-up Soviet bloc as well as in that of the former Yugoslavia, also largely fractionated. Russia and Turkey today, by this standard, are now "farther" away from each other than they have been for centuries. So, too, are Austria and Greece, for example, with Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia as well as Yugoslavia now situated in between them.
Of course, in Europe as a whole, there may be some reduction in topological spaces. A former British foreign secretary, Robin Cook, speaking in Budapest in July 2000 in favor of EU enlargement, declared that he wished "to see a zone of peace, prosperity, stability and democracy from the Baltic to the Black Sea and from Portugal to Poland." He alluded to one of his predecessors who "once said, 'My foreign policy is to take a ticket at Victoria Station and go anywhere I damn well please.' Enlargement will make that freedom of movement a reality throughout our continent" (Cook, 2000) . That Great Britain does not yet participate in the Schengen arrangement for liberalized border controls within most of the EU area ("Schengenland") and has not yet entered the euro-zone suggests the political limitations on Cook's vision. There is likely to be, still, some "variable geometry" in Europe and an incremental development of a differentiated "Europe of concentric circles" (Jönsson, Tägil, and Törnquist, 2000: 133) . Furthermore, post-11 September nationalistic concerns, in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, regarding "homeland security" may further restrict hopes for a more open and expanded continent (Europe, 2002) .
We thus are reminded that there is a vertical dimension, or hierarchical aspect, to the progress of European political construction. Europe's complex spheres of local, regional, national, and continental policy-making increasingly overlap and intersect. Political scientist Michael Keating refers to this as the "interpenetration of territorial policy spaces" (Keating, 1998: 183) . The topology of the process of Europe's growth is very intricate. Good maps, mental ones and also actual graphic ones, relating to jurisdictional and administrative arrangements are needed in order for people to keep these policy spaces straight. Necessary, also, are organizing map-concepts such as "subsidiarity," according to which decisions, unless the European Union holds exclusive competence, may be taken at the lowest level possible-the higher levels of European authority being there, if and as needed, in subsidiary mode.
Attributional distance will become more, not less, relevant, as more and more nations, now technologically released in their communication and less confined in their travel and transport relationships, increasingly look for business "partners" and also ideological and political "friends" in other regions of the world. Interestbased affinity groups-such as the United States-led international "coalition against terrorism"-can, under current world conditions, more easily coalesce, or come closer together. This very contact, a somewhat forced intimacy, may make them more attentive to the attributional distances that still separate them, however. Thus further diplomatic concertation may be required. At the June 2000 Warsaw "Community of Democracies" ministerial meeting, the suggestion was made by then secretary of state Albright of creating "a democratic caucus within the UN and other appropriate institutions" (Albright, 2000a) .
Such interpersonal "networking," among participants in the anti-terrorism coalition too, can readily move from venue to venue, following the calendar of the world's now numerous international organizations. The increased ease of transportation facilitates such regular and frequent encounters-at the speed of a Concorde aircraft. Electronic communication makes possible even faster and more continuous, if still physically remote, contact. As Secretary Albright noted with enthusiasm when in Warsaw, "democratic societies will benefit from the availability of the Internet as a practical tool for conveying information about how to build and sustain free institutions." She particularly cited the example of the Local Government Information Network, or LOGIN, which "will allow participants from Central Europe to Central Asia to exchange information, legislative ideas, and lessons learned" (Albright, 2000c) . To LOGIN, however, is only to begin to communicate across distance.
Irrespective of all of these technological innovations and possibilities, there remains the original "Acheson gap"-the inescapable sense of distance, of physical and related kinds of remoteness, that makes foreign affairs essentially different from domestic affairs. No amount of diplomatic reportage or technical surveillance can fully re-create in the minds of statesmen, or others, the "vast external realm" within which events may take place that might require decisions, perhaps active intervention, or at least a response. In early 2002 the intensifying confrontation between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan over Kashmir required that the present US secretary of state, Colin Powell, to embark on "perhaps his most delicate diplomatic mission" (The New York Times, 2002a) to South Asia where, despite his long experience in government, he had never before traveled. He remarked upon this lacuna, and perhaps worried about what it meant-as perhaps Dean Acheson would have done. "Distances" between countries, as well as regions and continents, and the "civilizations" based on them, do remain. Not only physical, these geographically related removes are gravitational, topological, and attributional. For foreign policy makers themselves, this condition may be a good thing. Not only in concept, but in the practice of international relations, diplomacy depends on distances.
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